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Donald, sat down with the author for a conversation about the role of the judiciary in era 
since the introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1.  The conversation 
sparked discussion about the broad spectrum of important relationships in which the judici-
ary must engage.  These include the relationships that the judiciary maintains with the bar, 
the litigants before it, the media, the public and, ultimately, the personal and professional 
relationships that exist between individual members of the judiciary.  Maintaining these 
relationships requires judges to engage in a variety of balancing acts.  One systemic concern 
for judges is the sometimes difficult effect that these balancing acts may have on judicial 
independence.  The issue is particularly acute in the Charter era as individual rights are 
increasingly emphasized, sometimes in preference to other rights or interests.  For example, 














resonates throughout much of this conversation.  
Chief Justice MacDonald brings a broad perspective to this conversation.  He has been able 


















a litigator in Sydney, Nova Scotia for fifteen years before being appointed to the Trial Divi-
sion of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in April of 1995.  In January of 2005, he was ap-
pointed Chief Justice of Nova Scotia, filling the void left by the retiring Honourable Justice 











































I would certainly agree with that assertion.  I have always conceived of the judiciary 
as a constitutional guardian, but I certainly agree with the constitutional gardener 
metaphor as well.  It is worth noting that this is the 19th anniversary of the deci-
sion in R.  v. Morgentaler.3  Former Justice Bertha Wilson of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, in that case, gave what I thought was a very succinct, and overall, the best 
description of a judge’s role as far as the Charter is concerned.  She said at paragraph 
226 of that judgment:
The Charter is predicated on a particular conception of the place of the indi-















1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 






























vidual in society. The individual is not a totally independent entity discon-
nected from the society in which he or she lives. Neither, however, is the 
individual a mere cog in an impersonal machine in which his or her values, 
goals and aspirations are subordinated to those of the collectivity. The indi-










of activities and decisions open to legitimate government control while, at 
the same time, placing limits on the proper scope of that control. Thus the 
rights guaranteed in the Charter erect around each individual (metaphori-
cally speaking) an invisible fence over which the state will not be allowed to 
trespass. The role of the court is to map out, piece by piece, the parameters 



















































The Charter is twenty-five years old in a few months time and I have seen an amaz-
ing transition during this period.  When the Charter first came out, at least at the 
lower court level, it was not given much attention at all. I must say that it has been 
given significant attention -- and teeth -- through the various rulings of the Su-
preme Court of Canada.  We have clearly gone from a parliamentary democracy 
to a constitutional democracy. I think, as such, the role of the Court has never been 
more important. The courts have been designated as the guardians of the Charter 
and, while Parliament obviously still remains supreme, this new role for the judici-
ary certainly puts the courts in the forefront. Parliament can only enact laws that 
pass constitutional muster, that don’t trespass unreasonably or improperly upon 
our constitutional rights and, in many ways, because of this role, the courts have 
been accused by some of being “activist.”  The courts attempt to interpret the Char-
ter while, at the same time balancing the rights of various individuals as these rights 
may apply to the Charter while still paying heed to Parliament’s supremacy. There 
is necessarily a balancing act going on there. It’s a natural tension. It’s a healthy 
tension, I think, and there is what has been referred to as the dialogue between 
the courts, primarily the Supreme Court of Canada, and Parliament, in terms of 
Parliament passing legislation, the courts finding it unconstitutional, either reading 
it down, or perhaps providing guidance, and then Parliament responding and so 
































































































    General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, the Supreme Court 
of Canada gave a broad interpretation to the media’s right to freedom of expression.  The majority of the Court 
essentially stated that the press has to be free to comment on court proceedings to ensure that the courts were 
seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.  
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I think the media’s role, in covering the courts and in being interested in the judici-
ary, has become more predominant because of the judiciary’s role in interpreting 
the Charter and striking down laws that were made by Parliament, which is su-
preme. I think that is new and that is controversial. We have been accused of being 
political, and that is news. That is important, and I think that is where the coverage 
comes from. I never did sense that because section 2 is now in the Charter that the 
media now has a wholly different job.  I think our work has become much more 
newsworthy. The judiciary is making news because it is complying with its role as 
gatekeeper of the Charter and it is striking down laws that Parliament has passed, 
and that is controversial. When Parliament speaks and the courts say “no,” that 
is news.  You have to be very, very aware of the important role the media plays in 
society.  We are much better off defining that role of the media as expansively as 
we can.  The goal when you are balancing rights is that you have to try to get the 
formula that brings out the most in both rights.  You have to use maybe a chisel as 
opposed to an axe—you have to try to carve out this metaphorical fence.  Can you 
allow more media access and still preserve fair trial rights?  It is an oversimplifica-
tion to say “Let us in for everything” and it is an oversimplification to say, perhaps 
for the judiciary’s sake, “You’re in for nothing.”  So you’ve got to work together and 



























































































































I think the rule remains that short of extraordinary circumstances, judges should 
speak through their judgments only and should not comment on specific cases. 
However, there is a limited role for the Chief Justice if the judiciary as an institution 
is under unfair attack.  Then I think there is a role for the Chief Justice, by conven-
tion, to speak up. I think it should be restricted to those cases.  We’ve done some-
thing, I think, somewhat unique in Nova Scotia and that is that in order to address 
the dilemma of having an inability to speak on specific cases, but at the same time 
wanting society to have a better understanding of the role of the judiciary in these 
various topics, we have on our Web site papers written by judges on these contro-
versial topics.  So we have on the shelf, so to speak, what would be our response 
generically.  So that gives us the opportunity to at least respond generally about the 









































































Interestingly, we have had the ability to bring cameras into the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal for the past twelve years. In fact, the study that prompted the action in On-
tario refers significantly to the progress that has been made in Nova Scotia as far as 
the relation between the courts and the media is concerned.  I think, I must say, that 
we in Nova Scotia have been on the cutting edge, if I can be so bold as to suggest 
insofar as our relationship with the media goes, and specifically cameras, at least in 
the Court of Appeal. We have a process where you have to apply to have cameras in 
the Court of Appeal but, strangely enough, we haven’t had that many requests.
There are all kinds of interesting issues involved in cameras in the courthouse, 
whether you have gavel to gavel coverage or just coverage here and there …wheth-
er you have one pool camera that is stationary and unobtrusive, or whether you 
have a bunch of cameras at the back of the courtroom. It’s very much a live issue. 
There are arguments going both ways, particularly in the trial courts because, of 
course, you are balancing these respective rights again.  I think that if anything is 
learned, it is that this is a live issue and it deserves respectful study. I think if we are 
going to solve the issue, we have to look at what would be evidence, and therefore, 
perhaps affected by the fact that cameras are present. That’s why there are fewer 
















































































































I think many members of the judiciary were apprehensive that a process like that, if 
it became like the process in the United States, would deter certain highly qualified 
lawyers from wanting anything to do with it.  There are privacy issues, too. When 
do you tell your senior partners that you’ve even applied? I think some judges after-
wards thought the process wasn’t as bad as it could have been. But that doesn’t take 
away the overall concern about the appointment process at a time when there ex-
isted a highly charged debate involving the judiciary. Does the process have the po-
tential of becoming something akin to what we’ve seen in the United States, which 
I don’t think is necessarily the best way to go for Canadian judges? I think that I still 



















































































states that the move is a “check on the discretion of the Prime Minister” and overall a “positive development.”  
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I have a concern, actually, about the way decisions are reported now. When I first 
started studying and practising law, it seemed that, obviously, there were much 
fewer decisions and it seemed a decision was published if it had precedential value; 
it was polished like an apple, it was out there and it stood for something. Now, with 
electronic publishing, everything gets published, so it’s quantity over quality.  My 
point would be simply this: we should look at the quality of decisions, which I think 
has been first rate. I think it has been great that many of the decisions coming from 
the Supreme Court of Canada have been unanimous on very, very tough issues.  I 
have no concern about the number of judgments issued by the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Obviously, they have a leave process and they have the responsibility to 
limit decisions. Certainly, I think their book of business is healthy and I wouldn’t 
worry about the fact that there may be fewer [decisions] in one year than in another. 
Generally speaking, however, I would, prefer to perhaps tweak the system a little 




































































































Every crisis presents an opportunity. The Marshall Inquiry is one such example. 
The tragedy involving Sandy Seal and Donald Marshall Jr. has resulted in reform 
in criminal law and the law of disclosure, which was non-existent prior to the Mar-
shall Inquiry, to create a very comprehensive set of rules for disclosure and other 
measures to preserve the presumption of innocence in this country, which makes 
Canada leading the way in many ways.  It is through that tragedy that this has 
happened.  I think another example may be unfolding as we speak and that is the 
challenge of youth justice and the tragedy involved with the McEvoy case.  We 
now have a very comprehensive report “Spiralling out of Control: Lessons Learned 
















































Oracle (Toronto: Published for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History by University of Toronto Press, 









this report will be a platform for the kind of change that is necessary today and was 
as well at the time of the Marshall Inquiry.  Very often we call it a silver lining, but 
within tragedies, there are opportunities.  I think it’s important for all of us involved 
in the justice system to take this opportunity now and follow up on serious initia-
tives for youth justice, which is a major challenge for everyone involved in the jus-
tice system. Under the theme of addressing tragedy and opportunities as they arise, 
that’s hopefully what we have learned from Marshall and what we hope to learn 
from the McEvoy case as well.  Hopefully, it will be a springboard for change, just as 
the Marshall Inquiry was a springboard for significant change in this province and 
in this country.  Overall, in Nova Scotia, I think we’ve made wonderful progress, 
























































It’s a major initiative as far as judicial education is concerned.  It’s a big part of ju-
dicial education; there are stand-alone social context seminars dealing solely with 
social context issues.  It’s also superimposed in educational initiatives on substan-
tive law.  Education is a big deal, as it should be.  But there is also a natural justice 
issue there – that is, the more that I, as a judge, learn about what somebody tells me 
of how society works, what duty do I have to counsel those who tell me the oppo-
site.  Do I say to them, “Well, I went to a conference last week and they said you’re 
wrong.  What do you say to that?”  I’m not knocking, but, in fact, am compliment-
ing the social context initiatives, noting however that with them come procedural 
complexities.  If judges are learning things about cases outside of the courtroom, 
then where does the right to respond come in? For instance, if a defence lawyer 
says to me in a sexual assault case “Of course she’s lying, Judge. Of course she’s 
making it up. Because she told the police this and she said this at the preliminary 
inquiry and she said that at the trial.  She has three different versions of her story. 
Now there are some similarities, but she said three different things. Disbelieve her. 
You can’t rely on this. This is unreliable.” Now what if last week, hypothetically, 
I went to a social context seminar and an expert on memory says, it has a ring of 
truth if there is a slight variation between the three. Do I say “By the way, have you 
read this article?” or do I decide that case on the basis on what I’ve learned outside 
of the courtroom and the defence lawyer has no idea that was an important part of 
the decision. What about the accused? These are difficult questions to which there 






























































Well, the thought I have on this is that judges may play that role, but it’s not one 
that they invent for themselves.  In a vain attempt to be funny, I will say that judges 
don’t wake up in the morning and say, “I think I’ll legalize marijuana today. So let’s 
13 
    Supra, note 10.  
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call a case and let’s do it.” In every case we decide, we are reacting.  So we may be 
springboards for social change, but that’s a product of our role.  It’s not a product 
of any kind of initiative on our part.  It wouldn’t be at our instigation, but it would 
be the product.  That’s why our role with the media is so important.  I think the 
media has to better understand where we’re coming from and I think we have to 
better understand where they’re coming from.  They are demanding more access to 
us because they can be accurate if they have more access.  We want them to better 








































We’re all, as judges, products of what we internalise from our lives.  But would you 
consciously go out and say, “Today’s the day I’m going to start moving society in 
a different direction?” No.  Furthermore, it is dangerous to think that you know 
something about a particular issue when you really don’t.  For example, what I’ve 
learned in my poverty law seminar is that often judges, because they’ve gone to col-
lege and occasionally didn’t have enough money to pay the bills, think they know 
poverty.  When in reality, poverty is a day in, day out, lifelong event for many 
people.  So maybe if someone comes to your court late, it might help to know how 
many bus transfers you need to get from where they’re coming.  And when they 
come to court with their two-year-old child (which happened to me) who runs up 
on the bench and crawls under the seat, you say, “This person may not have money 
for childcare.” So, of course, if I know more of what’s going on, that should make 







































































The dissent process is really a deductive process.  You write a dissent when you 
cannot agree with the majority judgment.  So I don’t think that you would ever 
write a dissent to move the law in a certain way, but your more fundamental ques-
tion, which is an interesting one, is when should you say, “We want to, at least in 
Nova Scotia, make a statement on the law on this.”  I think we err on the side of 
caution on that.  We try to only decide cases on issues that are essential to resolve 
the matter.  Very often there will be an appeal court judgment saying that there is no 
need to reply to grounds 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6—we’ll leave those for another day.  The Su-
preme Court of Canada often does that. The reason being is that the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s decisions are binding on all of the country’s courts. When I went to law 
school, the major dissenters were [Justices] Laskin, Spence and Dickson.  Very of-
ten, what they said became the majority.  So they were forerunners in terms of social 
justice for social change and change within the judiciary.  But at the same time, they 
were still dealing with cases brought before them and responding to requests that 
were presumably made by lawyers.  So there is a reactive element to everything.  It’s 
just the nature of the institution.  
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Our decisions are binding on lower courts.  If you’re going to make something that 
is binding, you should really stick to the issues that were full and square before 
you.  If you pluck an issue that you find so fascinating and interesting, but that was 
not articulated in the way that it should have been, then you’re really doing a dis-
service to every other litigant and every other court in Nova Scotia who’s bound to 
this decision, because maybe it wasn’t really the product of a fulsome debate as it 
should have been.  I try to be very cautious in terms of resolving issues that aren’t 
squarely before me. It’s hard to estimate the trickledown effect.  Every sentence we 
say may be taken out of a certain context.  You almost have to review your decision 
sentence-by-sentence to make sure that you’re not saying something that could be 
misconstrued or inconsistent with something else you’ve decided.  We are usually 



















































































I think the challenge for self-represented litigants represents one of the biggest chal-
lenges for the judiciary in this country, if not the biggest. It is a very complex prob-
lem, requiring a comprehensive solution. Courts have a very difficult time, as does 
everyone involved in the process, when there are self-represented litigants.  There 
is a bit of a challenge for the judge not to act as the lawyer, but, at the same time, 
to see that the process is completed in a timely and fair manner. You are trying to 
ensure a fair and efficient process; in order to do that, you have to provide some 
guidance.  Our role is not to act as advocate for the self-represented litigant but, 
rather to ensure that the process is fair.  
It is perhaps even more challenging when one party is self-represented and the 
other party is not. That leads to all kinds of problems in the litigation process that 
aren’t necessarily unfolding in the courtroom. For example, lawyers provide the 
very valuable service of giving undertakings and handling documents in escrow 
in a solicitor’s practice and this type of thing. How does the court treat a self-repre-
sented litigant as far as undertakings are concerned? They aren’t lawyers, nor are 
they officers of the court with the responsibility that lawyers would have.  
A self-represented litigant can do more harm than good if there is a jury, so there is 
a delicate walk as far as that is concerned.  There are so many different aspects of 
the jury trial from jury selection, to challenge for cause, to opening submissions, to 
the evidence, to closing submissions - and every step along the way is much more 
complex when you have a self-represented litigant. There are things you should 
14 
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and shouldn’t do.  Self-represented litigants very often, since they are caught up in 
their own case and are very emotional, do not understand the difference between 
submissions and evidence.  So, when they’re giving a submission to a jury, they 
are often giving evidence. For example, when they are accused, and don’t take the 
stand in their own defence, so they’re not cross-examined but then try to give what-
ever evidence they would have given when they’re summing up to the jury. It’s very 
complex and is driven by the rule of thumb. You can expect a trial with a self-rep-
resented litigant to be twenty to forty percent longer. For example, a five day trial 










































There are various types of self-represented litigants.  There is a body of litigants 
out there who cannot afford lawyers. We could spend the whole day talking about 
trying to solve that problem and we have to do what we can to help those people. 
With the Internet, there is also a group of self-represented litigants who probably 
could afford lawyers but think, “There’s nothing to this,” so they do it themselves. 
I think the more we try to provide access and help for people who really do need 
help, the more we accommodate people who really should and could have lawyers, 
but have chosen not to. 
So, there are about three categories: first, the legitimate, self-represented litigants 
who have to be self-represented to have access to justice. Those are the people we 
want to target and help as much as we can.  Second, we have the “Nothing to this” 
group, if I can refer to them as that.  Lastly, and, tragically, we have a smaller group 
of litigants who may be small in number, but take up an enormous amount of court 
time. Their problems are intertwined with mental health issues and it becomes very 
much a challenge for the judiciary when they bring cases; these cases can go on and 
on, and they don’t necessarily appreciate the process. For instance, they will issue 
subpoenas for the Pope, the Governor General, the Premier, the Prime Minister. 
It’s very sad. It provides a challenge not only for judges, but also for lawyers and 







































































































The judiciary is principally involved in what we call J.D.R. (Judicial Dispute Reso-
lution).  With certain judges there are philosophical problems with the court being 
16 




involved in Judicial Dispute Resolution, particularly on the criminal side. Even on 
the civil side, some judges feel that they were appointed to adjudicate and not to 
mediate, that that’s not our role.  Personally, when I was at the Trial Court, and in 
my role as Associate Chief Justice of that court, we promoted and embraced Judi-
cial Dispute Resolution. It answers the issue of access to justice. It does however 
come with its own set of complications when you are dealing with self-represented 
litigants. You certainly have to tape every conference because sometimes, at least 
when you’re dealing with two lawyers, there is usually not much dispute about 
what the judge said, but there could be a dispute about what the judge said with 
self-represented litigants or a misunderstanding about what the agreement was - 
again, only because they are not trained in the law - and so we tape those. 
But, they are very beneficial because they do provide access to justice in a couple 
of ways. The most important is the ability to have an impartial person trained in 
the law give a view as to what the outcome of their case may be. That judge will 
not be the trial judge, so it can be a very economical way to resolve the case, short 
of a trial. This benefits every other potential litigant out there in line for a trial date 
because if you can settle the case, then that frees up more [court] time. Then, instead 
of waiting a year for a trial date you may only wait six months. That is a benefit to 
the system, so to speak, in terms of our scheduling, and it is a benefit to the litigants 
because most lawyers will tell you that a case is better off if it can be settled because 
it is just so expensive to take a case through to its conclusion. 
So, it has a role that can be very positive and is something that we’ve embraced. 
However, there is an important distinction that has to be drawn. There is a role for 
the judiciary in Judicial Dispute Resolution, but it is not to resolve every dispute. 
There is very much a timing issue.  Early on, before the matter even approaches 
court, ADR should be encouraged. However, judges should not, in my opinion, be 
involved in the early ADR process. Let’s leave that for the private sector.  We don’t 
want to build a product that is cheaper and competes with the private sector. Cynics 
might say, “People get married in churches, not because of their religious convic-
tions, but because it’s free and it’s a beautiful surrounding.”  Well, people may want 
to go see the judge because it’s free. So there is an important distinction to be made 
about when the judiciary should be involved in Judicial Dispute Resolution. There 
is a role for the private sector which we strongly encourage before you ever ask for 
a court date, but if you’re involved in our process and booking a date in our docket, 
then we will do what we can to resolve it for the benefit of the parties specifically, 
















The advantage of the existing JDR is that it is meshed with the system, in terms of 
having us set the dates and tweaking it so that it’s timed, we think, best for settle-












reach great solutions on most cases? Absolutely. I think there is an advantage of 
having it annexed to the court system, at least, from the Court’s perspective, be-
cause otherwise I don’t think the incentive would be there to time it so that we’re 
alerted early enough to use the case. This way it’s resolved early enough and the 
system can be sensitive to the needs of the court as far as scheduling is concerned. 
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I think it fits a little bit like a hand in a glove because it’s really all one system that 





































































































I was on the Case-Flow Management Committee, which was a joint committee of 
the bench and bar. Through our Case-Flow Management Project (about eleven or 
twelve years ago), we were very proactive in managing our cases with the philoso-
phy that, if you asked for the Court’s involvement, your case became our business. 
We had thirty, sixty and ninety-day letters going out.  We had timelines for three 
different types of cases: fast-track, medium-track and complex-track. You had to 
have your case through the system within certain restricted timelines and this was 
great for the public, we felt, but the lawyers understandably felt pressured and 
[that] it was a breach of their independence. So, we had to fix it - which we did. 
We now have a very good system; it’s a home-grown Nova Scotia thing that I think 
works very well. 
I think we finally have it right in the sense that we now have timelines to preserve 
the efficient flow of cases through the system, but at the same time, give the bar 
the independence it needs to control its own cases with the lawyers’ respect to its 
clients.  We will now react as opposed to being proactive.  We have this relatively 
simple, efficient, and hopefully inexpensive appearance day system where every 
Friday at noon you can, on a couple of days’ notice, file a one-page notice saying, 
“I want to go to court because I’m delayed on this.”  You will see the judge who 
will take fifteen minutes, or whatever it takes, to get the case back on the rails.  Or, 
if defence has filed and in a certain one or two-year period, nothing has happened 
and the file is sleeping, we will instigate a wake-up call and ask the lawyers to come 
to that same appearance day session. So, the appearance day session will serve a 
couple of purposes: it will get cases back on track and will allow us to, not as ag-












































I do.  I think judges would be assigned on that basis.  On the trial court, for instance, 
I think an effort would be made, if it’s a rather unique subject-matter or complex 




the luxury of doing that in Ontario.  Justice Farley, now retired, was a bankruptcy 
expert. But I think that’s different than having sections isolated, like silos of justice 













Bankruptcy can be a complex area.  Family law, as I’ve indicated, is a separate area. 
In Toronto, I think and I could be wrong, they don’t have judges doing just murder 
cases for a career.  But they had a murder group for a couple of years. They have the 
numbers to specialise in it, [for example] Justice Watt does murders.  We wouldn’t 
have the luxury of doing that.  I suppose if you have somebody with a very strong 
criminal background as a lawyer and there was a very complex criminal case, you 
may want them to hear the matter.  Commercial transactions is another area, [par-
ticularly with] minority share-holder rights and these types of things. Complex 
commercial matters, I think, are sometimes best heard by someone with expertise. 
I don’t want to say, nor do I want to be taken as saying, that judges aren’t able to 
do these types of cases.  But certain cases may be a better fit, depending upon [the 
judge’s] background.
But, at the end of the day, we are a generalist court in Nova Scotia. Most superior 
courts in the country are generalist courts in the sense that their book of business 
covers everything.  We do have a Family Division where there are experts in family 
law.  Aside from that, and aside from picking a particular specialist for a particular 
type of case, which would be more of the exception than the rule, all the judges do 
everything.  I personally view that as healthy for this reason: the more specialised 
you become in one area, the stranger another area becomes to you.  I think the su-
perior courts in this country have to have a broad perspective about how justice is 
being administered generally. I’ve had many cases where I’ve had the top criminal 
lawyers before me [and] they had no idea about the civil process.  When I suggest 
that they exchange expert reports in the civil process, where in the criminal proc-
ess defence expert [reports] can come late, they were amazed at this process. For 
instance, this whole O’Connor19 jurisprudence and disclosure of third-party records 
- the civil side has been dealing with these kinds of issues forever. There is a lot of 
cross-pollenization going on.  If you have people who know just this area of the law 
and that area of the law, who knows it all? It sounds flippant, but who has got their 
eyes on the whole process here? I think the superior courts in this country have to 
be that way.  That doesn’t mean you cannot have judges who develop expertise in 

































































A judge who is flexible to go hear a case on short notice in this part of the province. 
A team player, which is interesting because you have to be fearlessly independent 
on a case-by-case basis, but in the court, you have to be a team player.  So there’s an 
19 
    R. v. O’Connor [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.
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irony there, but it is important.  On every one of your cases, of course you are inde-
pendent, and neither the Chief Justice nor anybody else can influence you.  What 
influence do Chief Justices have? None. They have a leadership role and hopefully 
the ability to have people come together and cooperate.  But every judge is inde-
pendent for the very good reason, that neither you, I, [nor] any of us, may interfere 
with how you make your decision.  
